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Abstract

A study was performed by the Construction Industry Research and Policy Center
at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, to identify causation for U.S. trench
collapse fatalities in the construction industry that occurred during the years 19971999. Of the 1217 fatality case files analyzed, 44 were categorized as trench
collapse fatalities. The 44 trench collapse case files were analyzed and the
contributed factors of the fatalities were identified in an effort to determine the
causation of collapses. The results of the study showed a large number of trenches
without any type of protective devices being used. The findings of the fatal
trench collapse investigation events suggest the fatal events might have been
prevented if there was compliance with OSHA regulations for protective devices
in the trenches, training of employees, and having an OSHA trained competent
person on site.

lV
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I. Introduction
OSHA conducts investigations of fatalities for two main purposes. The first is to
support the issuance of citations on a case-by-case basis. The second reason is to collect
data for a national fatality database, which is used to track trends and guide the
intervention process.
By tracking trends it was discovered that trench collapses rank, on average, as the
fifth most frequent category of construction fatalities investigated by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration during the 1991-2001 period (Schriver, 1993, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).
While falls from elevations, run-overs by construction equipment and
electrocutions were found to rank higher than trench collapses as categories of
construction fatalities, there are two reasons why the understanding of trench fatalities
may lead to cost-efficient intervention strategies. (1) Only workers in trenches (a very
small percent of on-site work) were exposed to injury from trench collapse while many
more construction workers were exposed to falls, electrocutions and run-overs by
construction equipment; therefore, the number of workers requiring safety training would
be quite small. (2) There were numerous causes of falls and electrocutions, while there
were fewer and certainly more controllable causes of fatal trench collapses.

History
One of the few documented construction trades as well as one of the oldest in
history was the trench digger. Prior to the 1950's all trenches were dug by hand and
1

shovel. Trenches could be found in construction work as well as warfare. Trenches were
used in both World Wars to protect the soldiers that were on the front lines. These
trenches were dug by hand and as they dug down deeper in the earth the workers/soldiers
would use pieces of timber to shore or support the walls of the trench.
Following World War II, the trench digger trade was quickly disappearing as an
established profession with the new "cabled" backhoes, and later the hydraulically
actuated backhoes. With the new high-powered backhoes, trenches could be dug quickly
and efficiently. Since workers were not inside digging and shoring as they go, trench
walls dug by the new backhoe were not shored or supported as often.
Trenching also shows up in other professions and other points in history as well.
Trenches are used in archeological digs to help determine where to dig, but the trenches
are small and shallow and are rarely deep. The Romans also used trenches for the
transport of water and were typically used along the sides of their roads to keep water
from collecting. Thus, trenching is a well-established activity in the construction
industry.

Purpose
The goal of this study is the analysis of the fatal trenching accidents, in United
States during 1997-1999, to determine why fatalities are occurring. The direct cause of
the fatality and the contributing physical and organizational factors are examined to
determine the effect on the accident. While examining the accidents, the usefulness of
the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) database is assessed. The case
files and IMIS are both used to compare the result and gather additional information.
2

II. Background of Trenches
There is a balance of the forces acting within the earth's soil, by the pressure of
the soil's weight acting downward and the horizontal confinement support from the
surrounding soil. Trenching removes some of the horizontal confinement and disturbs
the balance, resulting in a net increase in horizontal force toward and into the trench
opening. The internal soil strength, tries to resist this pressure (Matheson and Naylor,
1997). The balance of forces can be greatly affected and disturbed by simple vibrations,
large weight on the edge of the trench, cracks in the soil, and moisture content. The soil
strength, or stability, is classified using a soil classification system based on an analysis
of the soil's properties and performance characteristics. One important property is the
soil's cohesiveness, or the ability of the soil sticking together.
OSHA classifies soils into four categories in a decreasing order of stability:
Stable Rock, Type A, Type B, and Type C. A solid/stable rock trench is typically not
found because to trench into rock takes drilling or blasting. When the drilling or blasting
is done it normally causes cracks in the rock and can make it less stable.
Type A soil is the one step down from stable rock and can be composed of silt
clay or sandy clay. Soil cannot be classified as A if it has cracks, is subject to vibrations
(from cars, pile drivers, etc.), has been previously excavated, is layered soil (which is less
stable at the bottom), or there is water, and freezing or thawing conditions.
The soil categorized as Type B can include both cohesive and non-cohesive soil.
Typically if a soil is typed B, it's a Type A soil but has either cracks or is subjected to
vibrations. The soil can consist of silts, sandy loams, medium clays, and unstable rock.
3

Type C is the least stable and can be easily typed, because of the soil sloughing or
rolling into the trench. It can consist of any type of soil mix and often has standing water
or very high moisture content. It also can be overly dry and crumbly. It is critical for a
competent person onsite to classify soil type correctly because soil type is a determining
factor in specifying a protective system for trench work. For soil to be typed correctly a
competent person trained by OSHA needs to examine it and continue examining it
throughout the duration of the project. A trained person uses two types of tests to judge
the soil, a visual test and a manual test. A visual test can include inspecting the soil as it
is being removed and examining the spoil pile, the soil removed from the dig, and the
color and make-up of the excavation walls. A manual test means working with the soil
with either your hands or with an instrument designed to measure soil strength. For
example, if you can roll the soil in your hand into a long worm or ribbon, the soil is
cohesive and many be classified as A or B, depending on the conditions.
(www.afscme.org) But the prudent practice for trenching soil types, if a person is
uncertain of the type, then always assume Type C and plan for the best protection
available.
Trenches between five feet and twenty feet require acceptable protective measures
to protect the workers in the trench. Acceptable protective measures can consist of
shoring and sheeting, shielding, sloping, and/or benching. The layout, project, soil, and
characteristics of the trench are used to determine the correct level of protection. If the
depth of the trench is greater then twenty feet a registered professional engineer is
required to design the protective system in the trench. Shoring involves installing a
structure, such as a metal hydraulic or timber system that presses tightly against the
4

trench wall to prevent cave-in while shielding provides a sheltered space for the
employees to work. Sheeting is another shoring method that keeps the earth in place.
The sheeting can be driven into the ground for added support for the trench sides. Driven
sheeting is typically used when a trench is left open over a long period of time. Trench
boxes, or sometimes called shielding, are another common protective system used in
trenching (Figure 1 and 2). Trench boxes are typically used when a long trench is needed
(an example would be installing sewer/water lines). Trench boxes can be dragged along
the trench as the work is completed while continuing to protect the workers. Below are
some commonly accepted practices that need to be followed but are typically overlooked:
•

All personnel should be out of the trench box and out of the excavation when the
shield is being moved. If not, a person could be caught between the moving box
and a fixed object, like a pipe.

•

The top of the shield (or trench box) should extend at least eighteen inches above
the level of the trench. If it doesn't, material that was excavated could cave or roll
into the trench.

•

Some trench boxes are designed to be stacked on top of one another. Never stack
boxes that are not designed for that purpose, and do not stack them from different
manufacturers, as they may not be compatible and could fail if a collapse occurs.

•

The forces of a cave-in can push a trench box sideways, causing a hazard to the
workers in the trench. After a box is positioned, the voids between the box and
the trench wall should be filled with excavated material to prevent movement of
the box during a cave-in.

5

Figure 1-10 X 16 Single Wall Steel Trench Box

Figure 2 - Example of a Trench Box in Use
6

•

Shielding, trench boxes, sheeting, and shoring equipment should always be used
according to manufacturers tabulated data.

•

Workers should never leave the confines of the sheeting, shielding, or trench box.
Collapses can happen very quickly and without any warning.
(www.afscme.org)
Sloping is a technique used to cut the walls at angles; this reduces the forces

placed on the soil, which can cause collapses. The cut of the angle or "angle of repose,"
as it is typically called, differs depending on the type of soil. For Type A soil each foot
in depth, the trench needs to be sloped back at least half a foot (Figure 3). Type B soil
needs to sloped back at least ¾ of a foot for each foot in depth (Figure 4), and Type C at
least a full foot and a half sloped is required (Figure 5). If the sloping meets all the
correct dimensions then the trench meets the standards set by OSHA.

20'Max.

Figure 3 - An Example of a Sloped Trench for Type A Soil
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Figure 4 - An Example of a Sloped Trench for Type B Soil
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Figure 5 - An Example of a Sloped Trench for Type C Soil
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Benching (Figure 6) is a similar technique to sloping, in that the walls of the
trench are cut back. But instead of cutting the walls at angles, benching cuts the walls
into 90-degree angles or steps. It uses the same slope requirements needed in sloping with
maximum step height of 5 feet and width at 4 feet.
Stable excavating occurs when soil movement is limited by methods to reduce the
lateral stress at the excavation opening such as shoring, sloping, or shielding. The
stability of the trench is affected by many factors including: an increase in depth of cut,
change in soil water content, unstable or previously disturbed soil, surface cracks near the
excavation face, shock or vibration, changes in weather, and the weight and proximity of
excavated soil (Matheson and Naylor, 1997).
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Figure 6 - An Example of a Benched Trench for Type B Soil
(Other soil types are constructed similarly)
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Figure 7-Example of Soil Weight (Mickle, 1991)

During a trench failure, the walls collapse suddenly with little or no time for the
worker to react. A small amount of dirt falling on a worker does not seem so treacherous,
but a single cubic yard of dirt can weigh over 2,700 pounds and could reach up to 4,000
pounds for some types of soil and moisture content (Figure 7). This is equivalent to the
weight of a small pick-up truck. The weight of this soil can crush the body, which can
cause death in a matter of minutes (Hayslip, 2002).
Because of the dangers involved, OSHA requires a competent person onsite on a
I

daily basis that has a thorough knowledge of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR
1926.650-652/ Subpart P). See Figures 8 and 9 for examples of unsafe trenching
conditions. This competent person should understand how to classify soil types, know the

10
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Figure 8 - Example of a Trench without Protection

Figure 9 - An Example of Trench without any Protection and
Numerous Other Hazards
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different types and proper use of safety equipment, and have the ability to recognize,
prohibit, and correct unsafe conditions (www.afscme.org).

Common Myths of Trenching
In trench collapses there are always "tall tales" or myths. These myths are often
believed because people can be afraid of the real truth. One such "tale" is the belief that
if the trench starts to collapse I can out run the soil before it gets me. If dirt is falling
only a distance of 10 feet, it can be moving 25 feet per second, or a little over 17.5 mph.
Another myth is the belief that I can tie a rope around my waist and if the trench
collapses the rescuers can find me. This is somewhat true; the rescuers could find you,
but not in time. A person can suffocate in only 4 to 6 minutes when buried in a trench,
and under the best rescue conditions, e.g. removing 2 cubic feet of dirt every minute, it
could typically take 15 minutes to rescue a victim. An additional myth is that a backhoe
can easily save somebody in a few seconds if the trench collapses. Possibly true, but one
miscalculation and the backhoe could really cause some serious injuries to the victim.
Lastly, is the belief that a trench can smell "funny" or the dirt can smell peculiar just
before a cave-in. Unfortunately, there is not an olfactory indication before a trench
collapses (Rekus, 1992).
OSHA and Trenches
In September 1985 OSHA announced a special emphasis program for
enforcement of the existing trench and excavation standard, and in April 1987 issued a
12

Notice ofProposed Rulemaking announcing that OSHA intended to revise the standard
(OSHA, 1987). This update was recognized as being needed because of the hazardous
conditions in trenches as well as the numerous injuries and fatalities. OSHA believed an
update of the standard would bring awareness and attention to safety and would decrease
injuries and fatalities. Viscusi reported that during the 1970's OSHA enforcement had no
effect on injury rates (Viscusi, 1979). A later analysis for 1973 to 1983 found that OSHA
inspections resulted in a 2 to 3% decline in injury rates (Viscusi, 1986). It has long been
thought if the guidelines, e.g. if trench boxes (or sloping) are used, then the fatally level
would be greatly decreased. The majority of the deaths in trenches were where protective
measures, such as sloping or shoring, were not properly implemented. After a new
standard was adopted at the beginning of 1990, Dr. Anthony Suruda conducted a study to
determine the effect that the new standard had on the construction industry. Suruda
examined the five years before the new standard and five years after the adoption. There
was a 2-fold decline in the rate of fatal injury after the revision of the standard, which
substantially exceeded the decline in other causes of fatal injury in the construction
industry during the same period (Suruda, 2002). Unlike in the past, OSHA's new
standard did aid in the decrease of fatalities. However, the question still exists as to why
were trenching fatalities are still occurring? Over the next five years after Suruda' s
study, the trenching fatality rate compared to the total construction fatalities was fairly
consistent (Table 1). Suruda's study proved that OSHA's new guidelines decreased the
fatalities, yet fatalities over the next five years (after his study) have not decreased.
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Table 1:
Trenching Fatality Rate vs. Total
Construction Fatality Rates
(Schriver, 1996-01)
Percent
3.70%
5.40%
4.10%
3.80%
4.10%

Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Rank
11
7
8
10
12

The intent of this work is to take the next step and try to determine if the trenching
fatalities have any pattern, or if there were violations that may have led to the events. So
the main question is asked, what is causing the fatalities in trenches?
OSHA issues citations during surprise inspections, and also as a result of fatality
investigations. OSHA uses these citations as a way to penalize the employers for not
following the safety guidelines. Normally the financial penalty is commensurate with the
seriousness of the violations. OSHA classifies four levels of violations, Willfut Repeat,
Serious, and Other. A Willful violation is only assigned when it is clear that the
employer has complete knowledge of the safety standards he was breaking, but
performed the construction work anyway. A Repeat violation is where an employer has
been previous cited for the same safety standard violation. A Serious violation, which are
the most common issued, are assigned anytime a safety standard is broken. This level
can be issued when the employer is unfamiliar with the standard or did not know they
were breaking a standard. The "Other" level of violation is a less serious violation.
These are "lesser safety standards" and are typically reporting or paperwork violations.

14

The financial penalties associated with the violations can depend on many factors,
including the size of the company (number of employees), the history of the company's
violations, and the good faith of the company. A good faith reduction can be assigned
depending on "how willing" the employer is to change for future safety. The size
reductions typically range from 1 0 to 75% depending on the company, where history is a
1 0% drop if the company has not had a violation in the past 3 years and typically good
faith is a 1 5% reduction.
Violations are one of the techniques OSHA uses to convince or help force
companies into compliance. Despite the increased OSHA emphasis on safety standards
enforcement in the mid-80' s, open trenching contractors continued to dominate the
construction industry in OSHA standards violations. In a 1 995 OSHA report listing the
1 00 most frequently cited OSHA construction safety violations, open trenching rated in
the top five (Anonymous, 2001). The situation has not changed and the violations for
trenching still rank very high. According to the 2001 OSHA Industry Report: Open
trenching has the highest number of OSHA safety violations of all heavy construction
industries . . . Further, open trenching leads all of the above (all US occupations) in dollar
volume of assessed penalties by OSHA (Anonymous, 2001 ). So they are high in dollar
as well as having a large number of violations.

The National Database
The Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) database is a collection
of fatality investigations that OSHA has maintained on each fatal event. This national
database consists of data from OSHA Forms (Appendix D}, completed by inspectors
15

during investigations. The information in the database contains information on the
employer, the victim, accident, and the construction project.
The employer data contains the company name, location of the company,
violations associated with the accident, number of employees, and the Standard
Identification Code (SIC) number. The SIC number is used to identify the normal work a
company does. For example, a painting contractor (1720) would have a different SIC
number then an excavation contractor (1794).
The victim data will contain the sex, age, occupation, and task of the victim. The
occupation and task differ in that occupation is what a person normally does, where the
task asks if, when the victim died, was this their normal task or was this a new job for
them.
The accident data will have the operation the victim was performing, contributing
operation, the fatality cause, and a brief narrative (description of the event). The
difference between the operation the victim was performing and contributing operation is
that the contributing could have nothing to do with the victim's operation. An example
would be a carpenter is cutting a piece of wood for framework on a new residential
house, when the roofers on the roof drop some shingles on his head. The operation
would be carpentry with a contributing operation of roofing.
The last collection of data in IMIS is the project data. The project data will
include the end use of the project, the project type, and cost of the project. The end use is
a code given to the project by its definition of what the finished construction will be.
Hotels, residential houses, waterlines, and excavations are all examples of different end
use codes. The project type is different from the end use in that it asks if the project is
16

new construction, an addition, an alteration, or demolition work. The project type can
normally be easily identified.
With all this data in one central location, it can be used to identify trends and
track fatalities in various construction projects and the different construction operations.

17

III. Methods

Since 1991, the Construction Industry Research and Policy Center (CIRPC) at
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, has analyzed the causes of fatal incidents in the
construction industry for the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA)
using "investigation-collected data" (Schriver, 1993-2001). CIRPC has analyzed this
data in an effort to identify and rank the leading fatal operations in construction, assist
OSHA in identifying factors that contribute to fatal incidents, and suggest intervention
strategies aimed at preventing similar types of incidents. The CIRPC recently completed
a review of 1997-1999 fatality cases files provided by OSHA area offices. The review
centered on the information in the cases, the correctness of the national database, and to
discover any trends of the fatalities in the construction industry. Two principal sources of
"investigation-collected data" were used in this study: the IMIS database data entered
from the OSHA Form 170 (Investigation Summary), and the case files (Case files exact
content is varied but typically includes: OSHA forms 1 (Inspection Report), I A
(Inspection Narrative), l B (Worksheet), 2 (Citation & Notification of Penalty), and 3 6
(Fatality/Catastrophe Report), along with field notes, photographs, police reports,
interviews, newspaper clippings, autopsies, and sketches) that document OSHA's
investigations of the fatal incidents. OSHA' s Office of Statistics maintains the IMIS
database.
To assist in the review and coding of the cases, a checklist (Figure 10) was
created.

CIRPC only reviewed the fatal incidents in Federal Planned States (See Table

2).
18

Table 2:
Federal and State Planned States

Federal Planned States
AL
MS
MT
AR
ND
co
NE
CT
D.C.
NH
NJ
DE
NY
FL
OH
GA
ID
PA
RI
IL
SD
KS
TX
LA
WI
ME
MA
WV
MO

State Planned States
AK
NM
NC
AZ
CA
OK
HI
OR
IN
SC
IA
TN
KY
UT
MD
VT
MI
VA
MN
WA
NV
WY

19

1. Check Activity Number (Make sure it matches file)
2. Check Event Date (Make sure it's the right year)
3. Check Company Name
4. Check the Degree, only accept a Degree of 1
5. Check State (Do not accept states Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
6. Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New
7. Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee,
8. Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming)
9. Check the SIC Number, accept only construction
10. Check Occupation
11. Check or Re-code End Use Code
12. Check or Re-code Project Type Code
13. Check or Re-code Construction Operation Codes
14. Check or Re-code Fatality Cause (Direct Cause) Codes
15. Do not accept any natural cause deaths (i.e. Heart Attacks)
16. Do not accept any drug related deaths
17. Remove any Duplicate Files
18. Check Day of the Week and Time of Day
19. Check Contributing Causes
20. Check Soil Type and Depth of Trench

21. Check Age of Victim

Figure 10:
Check list for Federal Data File Review

20

fatality. The contributing factors were then graphed and charted to determine the leading
causes and discover any trends in the data.

22

IV. Data and Results

After reviewing all the case files, the results of: victim's occupation, age,
contributing physical and organizational factors (the little factors that may have aided in
the accident), day of the week, time of day, trench dimensions, types of protective
devices used, soil conditions, and citations were analyzed. The direct cause of each of
the 44 fatal events was by definition, crushing or suffocation, due to the physical collapse
of trenches in which the victims were working.
The occupations of the majority of the victims were laborers (See Appendix A,
Figure. A-1) and their ages ranged from 25 to 34 (Figure. A-10). Figure A-10 shows the
comparison of the Annual Age Average in the Construction Industry for 2001 reported by
Current Population Survey (CPS) with the age breakdowns of all construction fatalities
and trenching fatalities. When comparing this age data with the Current Population
Survey's (CPS) Annual Age Average (Figure A-9) for the Construction Industry, there
was a similarity between the total ages for each category (www.bls.census.gov/cps).
Figure A-2 shows the frequency of the presence of contributing physical and
organizational factors that may have contributed to either the collapse itself or the
collapse resulting in a fatality. In 52 percent (23) of the fatal cases there was no training
provided on safety procedures for trenching, and in 48 percent (21) of the cases no
competent person was present at the work sites. There were eight other contributing
physical and organizational factors which contributed to the trenching fatalities: 41
percent (18) of the cases had spoil piles within two feet of the trench edge; in 30 percent
(13) of the cases known procedures/training/warnings were disregarded; in 30 percent
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(13) of the cases there was a failure to conduct safety walks (or daily inspection); in 25
percent (11) of the cases there was no written procedures for trenching/excavation; in 21
percent (9) of the cases safety rules were not likely to have been known; in 21 percent (9)
of the cases there was an improper classification of soil types or required sloping
specifications.
Table 3 indicates the most frequently cited violations of OSHA's trenching
regulations. The top citied OSHA violation was the lack of protection (benching,
sloping, shoring, trench box, etc.) of employees in excavations (1926.652(a)(l )). The
second highest was the lack of daily inspections of excavations by a competent person
(1926.651(k)(l )). OSHA requires a competent person to inspect the trench site often to
check for possible dangers. Instructing employees in recognition and avoidance of
unsafe conditions (1926.21(b)(2)) was the next highest. This requirement was violated
when employees have not been trained in the recognition of a dangerous situation. The
fourth highest was the violation of materials and equipment that are within two feet from
edge of the trench (1926.6510)(2)). Lastly, the lack of means of egress from a trench
(1926.651(c)(2)) ranked the fifth highest. OSHA requires a ladder for the safe entrance
and exit out of a trench.
Figure A-3 shows the trenching fatalities broken down by the day of the week.
Each day showed a similar total, except for a drop on the weekends. OSHA found that
fatalities were spread proportionately among: 1) the days of the week, 2) union and
nonunion sites, 3) age groups, 4) various size companies, and 5) federal plan and state
plan sites (OSHA, 199 1 ).
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TABLE 3:
Leading Citations for Trench Fatalities Inspected by OSHA, 1997-1999
Citation
t29 CFR 1926.652(a)(l): failure to provide adequate
tprotection (benching, sloping, shoring, trench box, etc.)
129 CFR 1926.651(k)(l): failure to conduct daily
ltnspections of excavations by a competent person
129 CFR 1926.21(b)(2): failure to instruct employees
!With respect to recognition and avoidance of unsafe
t29 CFR 1926.65l(j)(2): materials and equipment were
olaced within two feet from edge of the trench
29 CFR 1926.651(c)(2): failure to provide adequate
means of egress from trench
29 CFR 1926.l00(a): failure to require/enforce the use
of head protection by employees in trench
129 CFR 1926.651(h)(l): failure to provide sufficient
!Water drainage from trench
29 CFR 1926.651(j)(l): failure to protect employees
from loose soil or rock in excavations
29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2): failure to establish and maintain
a safety program requiring frequent inspections ofjob
sites, material and equipment by a competent person
t29 CFR 1926.651(k)(2): failure to remove employees
from unsafe excavation when hazard condition was
recognized by competent person
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Frequency

Percent
Cited

29

65.9%

23

52.3%

17

38.6%

16

36.4%

12

27.3%

6

13.6%

3

6.8%

3

6.8%

3

6.8%

3

6.8%

The depth of the trench data showed a large number of fatalities in the 5 to 9 foot
range with fewer fatalities, as the depths got deeper. Two other notable details observed
were a large number of the trench collapses occurred during the 11 :00 am to 1 :59 pm
time period (Figure A-4), and the soil type was typically tested as Type C (Figure A-6).
Figure A-5 shows that 66 percent (29) of fatal events might have been avoided if,
proper shoring, sloping or benching, had protected the excavation. Figure A-5 also
shows that 20 percent (9) of the fatal events were due to inadequately designed or
selected protections. In 11 percent (5) of the cases the victim left the protected area and in
2 percent (1) of the cases the victims were in a trench box but crushed by a pipe
(displaced by the collapse) and the inner trench box wall.
The trenching fatalities OSHA violation levels were also broken down for each
case file. The largest group was the Serious level with 143 citations followed by Willful
with 16 citations {Table 4).

Table 4:
Trenching Violation Data

Level
Serious
Willful
Repeat
Other

Number of Citations
143
16
2
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The trenching fatalities sorted with respect to the companies total employment
(Figure A-11) showed a large number of fatalities occurring in companies with 1 to 25
employees (31 fatalities) and companies with 26 to 100 employees (11).
The total dollar amount for all the trenching citations associated with the
violations was over $930,000 with a range of $3,000 to $153,450, and an average of
$21,000 per fatality. The OSHA violation history (Figure A-13) showed 12 (of 44) cases
of the company having a previous history of violations with OSHA, where 26 (of 44)
cases did not.
Only 3 victims (7%) were union members where 41 (93%) were not members of a
collective bargaining agreement (Table 5).

Table S:
Trenching Fatalities by Union Member

Classification
Not a Union Member
Union Member

Percent
93 .2%
6.8%

27

V. Analysis and Discussion
The top three categories of occupations of the victims of trench collapses were
laborers (32), plumbers (6), and pipe layers (4). The laborers typically could be
described as the least skilled (or the "new guy"). Many of them might feel that the
conditions are not safe, but might not have been properly trained to recognize the
hazards. It also isn't a surprise that plumbers and pipe layers were the next two highest
occupations. These two occupations typically work in trenches more often then others.
Thus, if these occupations were commonly found in trenches, then it would be common
for them to be involved in more fatalities. Perhaps this number is lower than laborers
because plumbers and pipe layers typically have more training and maybe more familiar
with the dangers of a trench.
Figure A-9 shows the comparison of the age averages of all construction fatalities,
trenching fatalities, and the total of all employees in the construction industry in 2001 (it
is assumed the total would not greatly change from 1997-99 to 2001). The construction
fatalities age and the annual age average for 2001, showed a very consistent comparison
that was very close to equal in percentage. The trenching fatalities for the age group 1619 showed twice as many fatalities and may be caused by the inexperience of their age
and construction work experience. They were fairly new to construction work and may
not be aware of the dangers of a trench collapse. The 25-34 age category was higher
because a large number of the construction work force is in this age range.
The contributing physical and organizational factors of a trench collapse were
typically indirect causes that would not directly cause the accident, but may have aided it
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in occurring. The number one factor was the lack of training provided for trenching. It is
important to point out that ten of the fourteen different factors are violations of an OSHA
regulation. If OSHA regulations and training of the employees had occurred, then many
of the contributing physical and organizational causes would not be factors and may have
prevented the fatality from occurring.
The leading citation for trenching fatalities was the lack of trench boxes,
benching, sloping (29). Performing trench excavation without a diligent, trained,
"competent person" (the second highest with 23 cases) exposes employees to risk of
injury or death. If the employer had trained the employees (the third highest citations
with 17 cases) many of the accidents may have been prevented. Trained employees may
recognize the hazards and dangers of the worksite and many accidents may be prevented.
The article from Concrete Products, "OSHA Conducts Study of Construction
Fatalities," (Hayslip, 2002) showed that fatalities were spread proportionally through the
days of the week. This was found to be true for this study for the regular work week
(Monday thru Friday), but it did show a large decrease during Saturdays and Sundays.
This would be expected because there is less construction work occurring during the
weekends.
The trenching fatalities, by the time of the day, showed a very large number of
accidents during the 11 :00 am to 1:59 pm time period, where the rest of the times were
fairly consistent. It is typically believed that the longer a trench stays open the greater the
likelihood of it collapsing. It is also believed the mid-day sun (if the day is sunny) can
heat up/bake/dry out the trench to the point where it becomes crumbly and less cohesive.
While it is not known if these factors can explain the reason for the increase during this
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time periods, it is known that each factor can definitely affect the stability of a trench and
may be the explanation. Anytime the soil type changes moisture content, the odds of a
collapse are greatly increased.
The depth of the trench involved in fatality showed a large number of collapses
(20) in the 5 to 9 feet depth. The most likely reason for so many deaths in the 5 to 9 feet
range was because there are more trenches dug at this depth than other depths. It could
be assumed the total number of fatalities in each category may be proportional to the total
number of trenches dug (in each category) for all construction over a certain time period.
The direct causes of trench collapses can be defined as the leading factor that
caused the fatality. There only needs to be one of these factors and it can lead to an
employee's death, where the contributing physical and organizational factors only aided
(and many of them could occur simultaneously) and the trench would not necessarily
collapse. The leader, by far, of the direct causes was the lack of a trench box, shoring, or
sloping (29 cases). Again 39 of the fatalities cases (no sloping/benching/shoring and
inadequately design/selected protection) could have been prevented, if the contractor had
followed OSHA regulations. The last direct cause (workers left the protected area) was
postulated to be related to the lack of employee training. It is noteworthy that all of the
top factors indicated a failure to comply with OSHA regulations for trenching.
If the soil type is unknown, then the best management practices would be to
assume the worst case or the Type C soil type level of protection. The trenching fatalities
by soil type showed a combined 39 soil types of Type C (assuming unknown is C). Type
B was only typed in 5 fatality cases, even though it's a slightly more cohesive soil, it still
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needs a certain level of benching/shoring. There were no cases of Type A soil or Stable
Rock.
The number of employed workers by the company showed that 75% percent of all
the trenching fatalities occurred in companies with 1 to 25 employees. The larger
companies did not have as many fatalities. There were only two fatalities with
companies with over 100 employees. The larger companies were more likely to have a
safety program as well as a safety department with a director. The smaller companies
could be the "ma and pa" type businesses and may not have a safety director or
department because of the added expense.
OSHA violation history showed 26 cases that did not have a history of violations
(three years without a citation) with OSHA. While 1 2 fatality cases had been cited for a
violation in the past three years
The trenching fatalities indicated that over 93% of the cases (41) were not union
members and only 7% of the cases (3) were union members. Some unions have training
programs available for their members, which may have influenced this total. Union
members also have union stewards, which can stop all construction work if they deem the
worksite as dangerous.
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VI. Conclusions

Unlike all previous studies, the OSHA inspector's case file report was available
for review and data collecting. Using these files was significant in aiding in identifying
the causative factors. The original purpose of the review of the IMIS records and case
files was to improve the quality and causal specificity of data obtained from OSHA's
investigations of fatal construction events. Data improvements are necessary for OSHA
to develop and implement strategies to improve workplace safety on construction sites
(Shriver 2002). The IMIS database is not sufficient to analyze the fatal accident's causal
factors by it self. The case file is needed to determine all the factors, direct and indirect,
of the accident.
As an obvious first step in preventing such fatalities in the future, we conclude
that all such operations should be done only in full compliance with existing OSHA
standards (NIOSH, 1995). The findings of this investigation of fatal construction events
suggest that fatal events, which occurred during the study period due to trench collapse,
could have easily been prevented if a competent person onsite had followed OSHA
regulations. In almost all trench cave-in cases, the workers in trenches were not protected
properly by either sloped sides, trench boxes, or shoring. In some fatality cases, trench
boxes were being used but workers would step out of the area protected by the trench box
and would be caught by a cave-in (Hinze, 1 998). When there was not a diligent
competent person on-site, it reflects a lack of training in the proper trenching
requirements. For trenching operations, employees need to be trained in safety of
trenches, their hazards, and all the regulations required by OSHA. It could be that many
32
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construction companies were aware of the excavation regulations, but working safely was
often sacrificed from ignorance of the situation, acceptance of employee risk, or schedule
demands. The long-term financial impact of potential penalties, lawsuits, and bad
publicity can, and in many cases should, put a contractor out of business (Johnson 1996).
Abiding by OSHA's regulations is the key to decreasing fatalities in trenching operations.
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VII. Comments and Recommendations

Even with all the known dangers of trenching and the numerous violations cited
by OSHA, it appears that employers were still taking substantial risks in trenching. So the
question of "why" needs to be asked and addressed. Many cases reviewed show
evidence that if the regulations had been followed there may not have been a death.
Contractors need to be made aware of the human and monetary costs involved when they
do not take the proper safety precautions. Additionally, they lose money due to the time
lost for the rescue attempt, time and labor to re-excavate the trench, hefty violation fines,
increased insurance premiums, and additional paperwork. In many cases, employers just
didn't think it could happen to them (www.ohioline.ag.ohio-state.edu 2001). Fatal
accidents also cost the employer money. Costs can stem from utility line damage when
excavations fail, increased construction and insurance costs, and increased liability costs
(Stidger, 2001). If the employer loses money then why ignore the safety standards? A
construction company may have the added incentive to finish construction work early.
Some companies receive large bonuses if the work was finished on schedule or before
time. If a company received a million dollar bonus for finishing early, a $20,000 dollar
penalty by OSHA may not be a concern.
OSHA needs to take a stronger stance. The violation penalties do not appear to be
high enough to force the companies into compliance. Willful and repeat violations
should be penalized harshly. And in many criminal charges should be made on
companies that knowingly neglect the safety regulations and especially companies that
have repeated willful violations.
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DATA COLLECTION FORM FOR TRENCH COLLAPSES
CIRPC # ----1. Deceased's work task prior to the fatal event-- Describe:
o What the person was doing when the event occurred--What was the
person trying to do?
o What was the outcome? (Describe what happened)
o What tools or equipment was he/she using? Provide nomenclature if
tools/equipment were a direct cause. (See item 5 below.)
o What materials (if any) were being handled by the employee?
2.

Describe physical location:
A) Where was the deceased located within the trench?
B) Located where relative to protective devices (was the person within a
protected area)?

3.

Describe trench engineering controls in place (trench boxes, shoring):

4.

Describe soil/trench variables:
o Soil type:
o Trench configuration: dimensions, data on benching/sloping :
o Other soil variables, such as excessive moisture:
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5.

Factors contributing to the incident: The following contributing factor categories
are provided as examples of the type of information that CIRPC may look for, and
are based upon findings from prior data reviews. Since CSHO's do not conduct
investigations or document findings in a standardized manner across the country,
the selection of any particular code(s) will not indicate that other factors were not
present. Note that multiple categorizations typically WILL apply
o Atmosphere
o Inadequate lighting
o

Body position
o Near open/active face of excavation without protection
o Between trench box inner wall and installed pipe

o

Employee misconduct/attitudes
o Bravado
o Disregarded prior warnings (except regarding procedures-see below)
o Disregarded prior training
o Jumped into trench

o

Engineering/planning via process hazard analysis
o Improperly selected trench box
o Inadequately designed shoring
o Material placed at edge of excavation, contributing to cave-in

o

Environment and worksite configuration
o Deceased had to work in inappropriate area due to worksite
configuration/area constraints

o

Ethnicity/culture/language (non-native speaker)

o

Foreman/superintendent
o Failure to conduct job site safety walks
o Knowledge of hazards but failure to take action
o Lack of designated trenching "competent person"

o

Human Error
o Failed to follow procedure

o

Maintenance related
o Trench box or shoring design adequate; failure due to inadequate
inspection/maintenance

o

New tasks/non-typical work
o Employee( s) responded to unplanned event
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o Type of project not typically performed by company
o Task seldom performed; management did not give thought to controls
or did not think controls were necessary for this infrequent task
o

Operator certifications/training inadequate (may not pertain to deceased,
but to contributing operation)

o

Safety programs
o Safety program verbal-only
o Lack of written trenching/excavation program
o Written programs unenforced

o

Site communication
o Relied on other contractors/specialists to provide "safety"

o

Site management
o Claims it intended protection but failed to provide-supplies not
delivered etc.
o Claims ignorance of applicable regulations
o Felt client would not pay for proper sloping, shoring or trench box
o Knew of requirements but did not intend to comply

o

Site scheduling
o Pressured to move quickly

o

Training
o No training provided regarding trenching/excavation
hazards/precautions
o Safety rules likely not known, based on co-worker interviews etc.

o

Trenching related:
o Contractor failed to follow sloping specifications in work plan
o Improper soil classification by competent person
o No sloping/benching/shoring/trench box
o Spoil pile within 2 feet of edge, on side of trench that collapsed
o Trench box available but not used
o Trench box needed greater depth (portions of trench wall fell in from
top of box)
o Trench box defective (equipment failure of trench box in place)
o Trench box in use but worker left the protected area
o Trench box did not fit into available workspace (e.g. needed shorter or
narrower box); utilities crossed trench and were in the way
o Trench box did not have bulkheads, material entered box from ends
o Operator failed to check trench before digging (disturbing materials
that subsequently caved in onto employee(s))
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6. Whether the work activity was a direct cause, vs. adjacent activities. For example, did
the trench collapse because the employee did something to disturb the trench wall, or
did the operator undercut the excavation near the deceased' s location, or was there no
distinct event?
o Direct
o Indirect
o Collapse caused neither directly by deceased' s actions, nor by
surrounding operations. Rather, by collapses/sloughing "waiting to
happen."
o Insufficient detail to ascertain
7. Whether or not the fatality was the result of an engineering design/equipment failure.
(Yes/No)
8. If the result of an engineering design/equipment failure:
a. Describe the failure:

b. Answer the following:
o Did the controls appear to have met OSHA design requirements under
Yes/No/unsure
the conditions of use?
o Was proper maintenance conducted?
Yes/No/unsure
o Was the engineered control used in accordance with manufacturer's
designer's recommendations?
Yes/No/unsure
o Describe variances, if any:

9. Was the particular phase of work on-schedule?
Yes/No/unsure
1 0. Tenure of employment on this job:
1 1. Time of day of event:
1 2. Employment size of parent company (enterprise) for which the deceased worked.
(CIRPC plans to use Dunn & Bradstreet data to confirm the figures reported within
IMIS; we presume funding for this activity.)=______
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13. Was the deceased working for a construction contractor, or another type of employer
engaged in force account work?
Contractor/force account
14. Was the deceased covered under a collective bargaining agreement, at the project on
which he/she was killed?
Yes/No/Unsure
15. Had the employer been subject to an OSHA compliance inspection within one year
prior to the fatal event? (CIRPC plans to obtain this data from IMIS inspection
Yes/No
records.)
16. Describe additional information needs, for this fatality case.

17. Describe what could have been feasibly done that may have prevented the incident.
(Compare this project to a compliant "safer" job, with emphasis in this question on
engineering controls, project tools/equipment and personal protective equipment.)

18. Describe conditions that made employer perceive compliance would be difficult or
impossible, where provided.

19. Other information worth noting and not captured elsewhere:
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U. S. Department of J �bor . .
Occupational Safety and , ·. h Administration
lnv�n .Summary

OSHA-1 70prinl(Jtcv . 1 1193)
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lnvestiption Nr.
CONSTRUcnoN ACCIDENT INFORMATION
Project Level Information
Type of Coastruc:tion
End-use Type of Cousauctioo Sire

If a buildina site, DWDber of stories (in feet):
If a DOil-building stJucture. heigm (in feet)
Project Cost

OSHA-l70print(Rn. 1 1193)
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U.S. Oepartment of Labor
Occupational Safety and Dealt'

oistration

Inspection Report

:1.��N.at}���;��{t.\�..�i�����;r�:r��::\����F��j�:�:t�7?\��:���;r:�:��f�:}.����:� ·;·�·:

lt;i::L

Mail ..
FAX : }
·�

1.,�01f��., . .
Secpe·o...�·

OSHA·l(Rev. 6/93)
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U. S. Department of Labor

Occupational Safety and Health

. Jnistration

Fatality/Catastrophe Report

OSHA-36 lRn. 2196)

68

"'.-,. Ut::JJ*'UDeAl 01 LaU>or
OccupaUoul Safecy and Health

Inspection Narrative

OSHA-lA(Rev. 6193)
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U. S. Department of Lahor

Occupational Safety and ff(

·Administration

Worksheet

20. Instance Description - De&cribe the following
a) Hazards-Operation/Condition
b) E.qulpmcnt
c) l.A>calioa

d) lnjury/lllncu

e) McuuremeolS
/;.
OSHA-1B/IBIHpriDI�. 9/93)
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23. Employer Knowledge :
24. Comments (Employer. Employee. Closina Conference)

25. Od1cr Employer Information :

OSHA-1B/IBIHprilll(Rev, 919Jj
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U.S.. Department of Labor

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

To:

lmpectlon Number:
Inspection Date(s):
Issuance Date:

lmpedion Site:

This Citation and Notification of Penalty (this Citation) describes violations of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970. The penalty(ies) listed herein is (arc) based on these violations. You must abate the violations
referred to in this Citation by the dates listed and pay the penalties proposed� unless within IS WOtking days
(excluding weekends and Federaq10Iidays) from your receipt of this Citation and Notification of Penalty you mail
a notice of contest to the U.S. �cnt of Labor Area Office at the address shown above. Please refer to ·the
enclosed booklet (OSHA 3000) which outlines your rights and responsibililies and which should be read in
conjunction with this fonn. lsslJaDU\of this Citation doe.s not comtitute a findin, that a violatlo� of the Act has
occurred unless there is a failure to -tontcat as provided for in the Act or, if contested, unless this Citation is
affinned by the Review Commission or a court.
Posting - The law-tequires that a copy of this Citation and Notification of Penalty be posted immediately in a
prominent place,a, or near the location of the violation(a) cited herein, or , if it is not practicable because of the
nature of the. dnployer•, operations, where it will be readily observable by all affected employees. This Citation
must rc;mdh posted until the violation(s) cited herein bas (have) been abated, or for 3 working days (excluding
weekends and Federal holidays), whichever is longer. The penalty dollar amounts need not be posted and may
be marked out or covered up prior to posting.
Informal Conference • An informal conference is not required. However, if you wish to have such a·
conference you may requeat one with the Area Director during � 15 working day contest period. During auch·
an informal conference you may present any evidence or views which you believe would support an adjustment
to the citation(s) and/or pcnalty(ics).

Citation and Notifteation of Penalty

Page l of
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OSHA-2

If you are considering a request for an infonnal confema to discuss any issues related to this Citation and
Notification of Penalty9 you must take care to schedule it early euough to allow time to contest after the informal
conference, should you decide lo do so. Pleaae keep in mind chat a written letter of intent to contesC nwst be
submitted to the Area Director within 15 working days ofyour receipt of du; Citation. The nmnins of this contest
period is not interrupted by an informal oonference.
If you decide to reque.,t an informal conference, caJI this office between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. for an
appoiotment, then complete, remove and poet 1he page 4 Notice to Employees next to this Citation and Notification
of Penalty as soon as the time, date, and place of the informal conference have been determined. Be sure to bring
Lo the conference any and all supporting documentation of existing conditiODI u well as any abatement steps taken
thus far. If conditions warrant, we can enter into an inronnal settlement agreement which amicably resolves th.u
matter without litigation or conte&t.
Right to Contest - You have the righc to contest this Citation and Notification of Penalty. You. may contest
all citacioo items or only individual items. You may also contest proposed penaltiea and/or abatement dates without
contesting the underlying violations . tJnlm you jp[orm theAraDfredorInfflitiPI that you intmd to contest
the dtation(s) yd/or proposed JnPJtv«nl within 15 wnrkipg dan after nqipt. the citationOO apd the
propecl pmalty(Jes) will becoge a flpaJ onJer or the Occupatiopal Sarety and Health Renew Comrnpno.
and may pot be reviewed by any court or agency.
Penalty Payment - Penalties are. due within 15 working days of receipt of this notification unless contested.
(See the enclosed booklet and the additional information provided related to the Debt Collection Act of 1982.)
Make your check or money order payable to "DOL-OSHA •. Please indicate the Inspection Number on the
remittance.
OSHA does not agree to any restrictions or r.onditions or endorsements put on any check or money order for Jess
tban the fulJ amount due, and will cash the check or money order as if these restrictions, conditions, or
endorsements do not exist.
Notiracation of CorTectlve Action - For violations which you do not contest, you should notify the U.S.
Deparcment of Labor Ami. Office promptly by letter that you have taken appropriate corrective action within the
time frame set forth on drll Citation. Please inform the Area Office in writing of the abatement' steps you have
taken and of their data, together with adequate supporting documentation, e.g. • drawings or photographs of
corrected conditions, purchase/work orders related to abatement actions, air samplin, results, etc. Attached is a
flll-in-t.hc-blank form Jetter for your use to assist you in meeting this requirement.

Employer Discrimination Unlawful - The law prohibits discrimination by an employer against an employee
for filing a <:Otq>laiol or for exercising any rights under this Act. An employee who believes that be/she has been
discriminated against may file a coq,laint no later than 30 days after the discrimination occurr� with the U.S.
Departmcot of Labor Arca Office at the address shown above.
Employer Rights and Responsibilities - The enclosed booklet (OSHA 3000) outlines additional employer
rights and responsibilities and should be read in conjunction with tMs notification.
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Nod� to Employees - The law gives an employee or his/her representative the opportumty to object to any
abatement date set for a violation if he/she believes the date to be unreasonable. The contest must be mailed to
the U.S. Department of Labor Area Office at the address shown above and pos1marked within 15 worltine days
(excluding weekends and Federal holidays) of the receipt by the employer of this Citation and Notification of
Penalty.
Abatement Methods - The empJoycr is not limited to ·abatement medlods suggested by OSHA; i.e. methods
explainod ue geocral and may not be effective in all cases. Other methods of abatement may be equally or more
appropriate. Ultimate responsibility for determining the most appropriate abatement method re.sll with the
employer, given its superior knowledge of the spt.Cific conditions at its worksite.
Inspection Actbity Data - You should be aware tbat OSHA publishes information on its inspection and ciwion
activity on the Internet under the provisiom of the Elec&ronic Freedom of Information Ad. The information related
to your inspection will be available 30 calendar days after the Citation Issuance Date. You arc encouraged to
review the infonnarion concerning your establishment at WWW.OSHA.GOV. Jf you have any dispute with the
accuracy of the information displayed, please contact this office.
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U.S. Department of Labor

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES OF INFORMAL CONFERENCE
An infonnal conference has been scheduled with OSHA to discuss the citation(s) issued on
The · conference will be held at the OSHA office located at
on _____ at _____
Employees and/or representatives of employees have a right to attend an infonnal conference.
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U.S. Department of Labor

OccupldonaJ Safety and Health Administration
Citation and NQtiffcation

or PmaJty

lmpedloa Nmnber:
lmpedloa»am:
Issuance Date:

Company Name:
lmpecdon Site:
The alleged violatiom below have been grouped because they involve similar or related hazards that may
increase the potential for illness.

Cilllion and Notification of Pcnaky
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U.S. Department of Labor

Occupational Safecy and Health Administration

lmpec:tioa Number:

Impec:tionl>atea:
Issuam:e Date:

Ciqtion and NQtifkatiop of Penalty
CGIIIPIDY Name:

�
�,
I
�
�.. , .,

..

lmpedioll Site:

Area Director
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U.S. Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Administration

INVOICE/
DEBT COLLECTION NOTICE
C...,.., Nw
lmpedloa Slte:
,......... n.te:

To avoid additional charges, please remit payment promptly to this Area Office for che total amount of. the
uncontested pem!tics summarized above. Make your check or money order payable to:
·ooL-OSHA". Please indicate OSHA'� lnspection Number (indicated above) on the remittance.
OSHA does not agree to any restrictions or conditions or endorsements put on any check or money order for less
than fuJI amount due, and will cub lhe cbcck or money order as if these restrlctiom, conditions, or endoncmem
do not exist.
Pursuant to the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-365) and rcplations of the U.S. Department of Labor
(29 CFR Part 20), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is required to assess interest, delinquent
cbuJes, and administrative costs for the collection of delinquent penalty debt, for violations of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.
lalciD:lt- Interest charaes will be assCNed at an annual rate determined by the Secrccary of the Treasury on an
penalty debt amounts not paid within one month (30 calendar daya) of the date on wbJch the debt amount becomes
due and payable (penalty due cbte). The current interest rate is S�. !merest will accrue from the date on which
the penalty amounts (u proposed or adjusted) become a final order of the OccupatioDa1 Safely and Heakb Review
Comminioo (that ii, 15 working days from your receipt of the Citation and Notification of Penalty). unless you
file a notice of contest. Interest charges will be waived if the full amount owed is paid within 30 calendar days
of the final order.
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